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,.~oreign Workers: Unwanted Guests? 
Large numbers of foreign workers now reside in Western European nations and in the 
United States. How to cope with the infiux of foreign workers has become a subject ;i.~ 
of extensive debate here and abroad. European countries have had mixed success in ~'1 ~ C 
dealing appropriately with this issue. This article about the European experience 
in migration management is condensed from a report written by David S. North, 
a Fund consultant. 
PRESIDENT CARTER has become the first U.S. President since Eisenhower to face up to the issues posed by perhaps millions of illegal alien workers in this country. Illegal immigrants present a variety 
of challenges to the nation: their unlawful presence is a 
legal problem, reflecting a major breakdown in the en-
forcement of the immigration law; they present a problem 
in international relations, as their home governments do 
not want them to return and swell unemployment rolls; 
there are suggestions that the illegals drain the welfare 
systems, and vigorous counter-arguments that they are 
more likely to pay taxes than use tax dollars; some look at 
them as needless additions to the populace, arriving at a 
time when the United States is approaching a stabilized 
population; and some ethnocentrists are concerned that 
these migrants are mostly brown or black. Then there are 
those-often from the Third World-who believe that 
there should be no barriers to international migration. 
The principal debate, however, has been over their role 
in the U.S. labor market. Former Immigration Commis-
sioner Leonard Chapman contended that the illegals are 
taking "good-paying jobs" from U.S. workers; others re-
plied that they are hard-working people who accepted jobs 
that Americans would not take (in farm labor, services, 
restaurants, etc.). A third view is that there probably is 
some one-to-one displacement of U.S. residents by the 
illegals ( a very docile, attractive work force), but their 
more significant impact is to loosen further an already 
loose labor market, which in turn depresses or conserves 
wages and working conditions in the places where they 
cluster. This third view leads to concern that the most 
powerless workers in the United States-blacks, Puerto 
Ricans, teenagers, the aging, and the handicapped-bear 
the brunt of the cost of the illegals. 
Facing this array of considerations, President Carter 
produced a complex group of proposals; while virtually 
every item in the package was without precedent in the 
United States, every one of them has been tried by one or 
more European nations, although this was apparently not 
known to the administration. 
The White House proposals deal with a class of persons 
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it labels "undocumented workers." The package would 
buttress the undermanned Border Patrol, but offers no 
additional support for the other two less glamorous, alien-
regulating units: the Consular Service of the State Depart-
ment, which issues, or denies, visas to would-be visitors; 
and the inspections function of the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service, which checks people seeking to enter 
the nation at the ports of entry. The White House also 
proposed: 
• Employer sanctions, punishing an employer of an il-
legal alien with fines; illegal workers are now punished, 
when caught, by expulsion from the country. 
• Amnesty for the more senior illegal aliens; those who 
had been in the country since 1970 would be given legal 
immigrant status. 
• Half-an-amnesty for less senior illegals; those who 
arrived between January 1, 1970, and January 1, 1977 
would be given "temporary resident alien status," which 
would allow them to work, pay taxes, and cross the border 
freely for a period of five years; they would not be allowed 
to use tax-supported programs or to use this status to 
bring their families to join them. 
• Economic development for the areas that are sending 
illegal aliens to the United States. 
In addition, there is some consideration within the Gov-
ernment of an assisted repatriation program, designed to 
encourage some illegal aliens to leave the nation and to 
stay away. 
The White House rationale was that regularizing the 
presence of all but the most recent illegals would elimi-
nate the 'need for a mass deportation program, while mak-
ing it less likely that the legalized ones would be exploited 
in the labor market. Further, the White House apparently 
felt that a tighter border coupled with employer sanctions 
would discourage illegal immigration in the short run, 
while economic development would ease the long-term 
push forces that cause many illegals to leave their home-
lands. 
The decisions of European governments to stop import-
ing foreign workers in recent years is usually linked with 
the unemployment that followed the oil crisis; one suspects 
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Foreign Workers 
in European Countries 
Austria: 189,000 





Sweden : 225,000 
Switzerland: 493,000 
(Source: OECD, 1977) 
that the oil crisis triggered those decisions, but other con-
siderations probably played a major role as well. By the 
early 1970s, the governments had become more aware of 
ethnic and social antagonisms toward the migrant workers. 
They sensed that people who had been regarded as a 
temporary part of the labor force had, in fact, become 
a permanent part of the population. They noticed inner-
city ghettoes and educational, social, and employment 
problems such as those experienced with the Turkish teen-
agers growing up in Germany. The European governments 
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decided to discourage further migration, but not t~ ~ell • ·, 
large numbers of migrants forcibly. 
The Carter Initiatives: Employer Sanctions 
Of the four Carter initiatives, only one is a "hard" en-
forcement program: the proposal that employers of illegal 
aliens be penalized. Four of the five nations that the author 
visited (France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland, but not 
Great Britain) have employer sanctions laws. These laws 
are easy to administer because alien workers need pass-
port-type documentation before they can work legally-
there is no such requirement in the United States, as U.S. 
employers point out to Congress, and to make such work 
permits mandatory might raise issues of civil liberties. 
Generally, employer sanctions programs have been 
mounted with little zeal, and often through decentralized 
enforcement machineries-comparable to asking Tam-
many Hall to enforce Prohibition. Faced with the lack of 
interest of local judges and police departments, France has 
turned to a centralized enforcement system, which is too 
new to evaluate, and the Dutch Government is leaning in 
the same direction. 
Some quantitative data are available in France, Ger-
many, and Belgium about the number of employers fined 
for employing illegal workers, the size of those fines, and 
the ratio of the incidence of fines to the size of the alien 
labor force, which are shown below. The French data do 
not reflect the new administrative fine system, which is set 
at about $600 per illegal worker hired. 
Incidence of Fines for Employing Illegals 
Number of 
Employers Ratio of 
Fined For Fines to Range of 
Employing Alien Worker Typical Fines 
Nation Illegals Population* (U.S.$) 
Germany 
(1976) 9,335 1/215 50-500 
France 
(1977) 1,910 1/777 130 or less 
Belgium 
(1976) 241 1/ 1,273 30-150 
* Based on the SOPEMI, Continuous Reporting System on 
Migration Estimates, published by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris. 
European officials say that these rather minor fines are 
only part of the penalties that employers must pay; in Ger-
many, they must also pay the airfare home of the expelled 
worker, and in all countries they must pay any previously 
ignored social security contributions, which are much 
more expensive to employers in Europe than is the com-
parable tax in the United States. It appears from those 
statistics that there are either very few illegal workers in 
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